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Abstract 
The focus of this study is to estimate an equation explaining the determinants of dowry. In this paper, 
we address a very common socio-economic problem for sub-continent, the problem of dowry. From a 
social planner's perspective, who wants to reduce overall dowry transfers, we consider the effect of 
change in a few relevant parameters like husband height, wife height, wet land, dry land, years of 
marriage and years of education for women & men on these decisions.  
According to the various studies the dowry phenomenon is exist heavily in rural sub-continent, at the 
same time research related to this system is very rare. The aim of this paper is to estimate an equation 
explaining the determinants of dowry. Several interpretations for dowry are distinguished using a simple 
theoretical framework and the predictions of this model are tested. Using the data provided us for this 
project is tested and reliable so that we will be able to draw our own testable relationships and 
determinants of dowry. The data will be use in the following sections for further analysis by estimating 
the determinants of dowry using multiple regression analysis. The study suggests that even though there 
are religious and cultural differences, the system of dowry in Pakistan appears to be for the same 
reasons as in India  
A theoretical framework was developed that was inclusive of all the required variables by testing 
through the multiple regression analysis and the experimental findings shows the independent variable 
used to test have an impact on dowry by applying multiple regression step-wise method.  
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INTRODUCTION: 
Dowry is one of those social practices which no educated person would own up with pride, although 
many still adhere to this much deplorable practice. Dowry continues to be given and taken. Even 
among the educated sections of society, dowry continues to form an essential part the negotiations that 
take place in an arranged marriage. (Birodkar 1994) 
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During the marriage ceremony the articles comprising the dowry are proudly displayed in the wedding 
hall. Dowry is still very much a status symbol. A number of marriage-negotiations break down if there 
is no consensus between the bride's and groom‟s families. Dowry deaths of a newly married bride are 
still regularly in the news. Although the practice of dowry exists in many countries, it has assumed the 
proportion of a challenge to the forces of modernity and change only in India. Many reasons are put 
forward for explaining this practice. It is said that a dowry is meant to help the newly-weds to set up 
their own home. Parents transfer wealth to their children in many ways. The dowry is distinctive 
because it is a large transfer made to a daughter at the time of her marriage. (Botticini & Siow, 2000). 
The sums of cash and goods involved are often so large that the payment can lead to impoverishment 
of the bridal family. This has a devastating effect on the lives of unmarried women who are 
increasingly considered burdensome economic liabilities. The custom of dowry has been linked to the 
practice of female infanticide and, among married women, to the more obvious connection with bride-
burning and dowry-death, i.e., physical harm visited on the wife if promised dowry payments are not 
forthcoming (Anderson, S., 2001). The dowry is given as compensation to the groom's parents for the 
amount they have spent in educating and upbringing their son. These explanations may seem logical in 
the present day context, but they cannot explain how this practice originated. 
Dowry is a massive social ill on both sides of the Pakistan-India border and who hasn‟t heard of the 
infamous bride burning where the girl who brings insufficient dowry is burnt „accidentally‟ by her in 
laws so that a new „prey‟ may be caught who can bring in a better dowry.(Sarfaraz. 2008) 
 
PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW THEORITICAL FRAME WORK: 
The rise of the dowry system among Muslims of subcontinent appears to date back only some 
decades. White (1992: 102) and Rozario (1992: 134) note that the prevalence of the system 
reflects a change over the last two generations, following the independence of Bangladesh. 
Dowry was previously practiced mainly in urbanized, more affluent classes. The 
„
tyranny of 
dowry
‟
 existed in urban areas since the late 1960s, but has now spread to rural populations 
(Alam and Matin, 1984:7). 
Like many other customs and social institutions in subcontinent, dowry is said to originate 
from Hindu customs. Traditional Hindu law recognizes several types  of marriage, the most 
approved being the Brahma form, where the bride‟s father gives her away without any 
consideration (Jhabvala, 1981: 18). In the Brahma form, the bride
‟
s father offered his daughter 
adorned properly, but was under no compulsion, and these gifts were given to the daughter 
personally (Apte, 1978: 201). Such voluntary gifts were to provide economic security for the 
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daughter in her new home and were considered as str
¯ıdhan (property of the woman). Ahmed 
and Naher (1987: 137) refer to Brahma marriage as dowry or joutuk marriage and argue that, 
though this form was once confined to Brahmins, it later became accepted by other 
castes.(Shahnaz, 2006) 
Some authors have tried to justify this system of dowry by reference to the practices of the Prophet 
Mohammed, that is, sunna. Despite agreement that dowry payments are not among the basics of a 
Muslim marriage, there are contentions that it forms part of the sunna of the Prophet, who gave certain 
items to his daughter Fatima at her marriage to Ali, the Prophet‟s cousin (Ansari, 1978: 80–1). The 
second instance quoted by those who see dowry as Islamic is the marriage of Zainab, another daughter 
of the Prophet, who was given a costly necklace by her rich mother (Ansari, 1978: 81). These are not 
regarded as normative sunna, however, since jahez was not mentioned for several other marriages 
during the Prophet‟s time, nor did the companions after the Prophet‟s time emphasize this practice 
(Ansari, 1978: 82–3). The Koran, the traditions of the Prophet (sunna) and other early scholars (for 
example, the Hedaya), do not back the practice of demanding dowry. The traditions of the Prophet 
call for a man to avoid doing from marriage until he can afford marriage and dower. If he cannot afford 
to get married, he should practice abstinence until Allah provides him with sufficient means.(Shahnaz. 
2006) 
In general, research directly pertaining to the custom of dowry in the rest of South Asia is relatively 
sparse. A notable exception is the study by Lindenbaum (1981) which investigates the transition from 
bride-price to dowry of a predominantly Muslim community in rural subcontinent. 
A woman in Pakistan is entitled by law at marriage to: (i) a dowry and marriage gifts from her parents; 
and (ii) a dower (mahr), a bridal gift from the groom which is generally intended to provide some 
insurance for her in the case of divorce (see Patel 1979, Korson and Sabzwari 1984, and Afzal et. al. 
1973). Further, Pakistani women have the right to inheritance and ownership of property. According to 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat), daughters are entitled to a half of the share which a son inherits from 
his father. It  is noted, however, that the dowry she receives at the time of marriage is usually 
considered her pre-mortem inheritance, which is typically less than she is entitled to under the law (see 
Donnan 1988 and Patel 1979).  
A natural question to ask in the exploration of Pakistani dowries is how this custom differs from those 
in India where the severe social consequences of rising dowries have motivated a large body of research 
aimed at explaining the phenomenon. The total cash and goods involved are so large that the dowry 
payment can lead to impoverishment of the bridal family. This has a devastating effect on the lives of 
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unmarried women who are increasingly considered stringent economic liabilities. For example, the 
custom of dowry is often linked to the practice of female infanticide. Other repercussions include 
extreme abuse of women as exemplified by terms like “bride-burning" and “dowry-death" becoming 
commonly used. The links to dowry inflation have been drawn by sociologists; for example, Kumari 
(1989), Chauhan (1995), McCoid (1989), Pawar (1990), Lata (1990), and Pathak (1990) address these 
issues.( Anderson, S., 2000). 
As already mentioned, this role for dowry has been emphasized in the recent literature of modern-day 
dowry payments in India. Others have observed that in societies where dowry has occurred, women 
were considered an economic burden since a wife performed little or no income-producing work for 
the household. The second interpretation of dowry therefore links the payments to the productivity of 
women and treats bride-price and dowry paid as opposites. In  societies where women are 
economically productive, a bride-price payment is made to their families to compensate for the loss 
of a worker. If women do not contribute to household income, dowry is paid to the groom's family as 
a compensation for an unproductive member. However, the most common form of dowry is a pre-
mortem female inheritance where women retain ownership of her gift during marriage, and can 
reclaim it for her own welfare if the marriage is dissolved (see, for example, Goody 1976 and 
Hughes 1985). This third definition of dowry is therefore associated with societies in which 
inheritance flowed to both sons and daughters. In several countries, dowry as a pre-mortem 
inheritance given to women was written into the constitution, as was traditionally the case in 
Pakistan (Anderson, S., 2000). 
On the other hand, characteristics of the bride‟s family at the time of marriage in conjunction with the 
characteristics of her spouse and his family determine the conditions of marriage such as dowries, 
marrying biological relatives, and age at marriage, which in turn affect subsequent socio-economic 
outcomes for the woman and her children Dalmia, (2004), Rao, (1993) and Mobarak and Kuhn and 
Peters, (2007). 
The aim of the next section is to develop a model which embeds and distinguishes these given 
variables in data in estimating the equation for dowry paid for marriage in rural subcontinent. 
 
Methodology: 
Data collection and sampling methods  
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To examine the variables to determine the dowry size, data set on bride-groom characteristics and 
dowry was selected and it was kindly been provided by A.B. Deo Lalikar.
1
 The data comprises 140 
respondents. The data will be use in the following sections for further analysis by estimating the 
determinants of dowry using multiple regression analysis by step-wise method. 
The study has been focused on analysis that dowry paid is dependent on which variables Subject in the 
rural subcontinent. Since the objective of study is to estimate the equation explaining the determinant 
of dowry so all the variables given in the data are takes as independent and the dowry paid is taken as 
dependent variable. 
The findings suggested that dowry paid is based on the status and the affluence of husband‟s family as 
well as the education of the husband‟s father that are the important determinants of the incidence of 
dowries. And also one more thing that the influence of husband‟s father education is accounted as a 
predictor for the system of dowry paid. However the literature is also analyzing that since the traditional 
custom of dowry in subcontinent is considered an inheritance to daughters, it appears that this custom 
still persists in rural areas whereas, like in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, the custom has evolved into a 
groom price payment in urban areas (Anderson, S., 2000). 
 Data Analysis: Methods/ Testing Criteria: 
To more thoroughly determine the determinants of dowry we employed multiple regression analysis. 
Table 1 reports the model summary from this study. 
 
Table 1.       Model Summary 
Model R R.Square Adjusted  
R square  
Std. error of  
The estimate 
Change statistics 
R square 
 Change 
F change Sig. F change 
1 .481
a
 .231 .226 28485.635 .231 41.481 .000 
2 .518
b
 .268 .258 27886.662 .037 6.992 .009 
a. Predictors: (constant), X11 
b. Predictors: (constant), X11, X20 
c. Dependent variable: X4 
 
The rationale is that value of R square shows that the final regression model can be predicted with two 
independent variables (wet land owned X11, and dummy Husband’s father secondary education 
X20) out of 19 independent variables explains 26.8% of the variance of dowry X4. That‟s not great but 
we‟re getting there. Value of Std. Error of the Estimate is also decreased in every step which 
                                                 
1
 The data have kindly been provided by A. B. Deo Lalikar to examine the demand for dowries and brides characteristics in 
marriages and empirical estimates for rural South Asia, to Manuscript University of Washington, September 1990. 
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demonstrates the improvement in the overall model fit. The findings from this analysis is shown in 
Table 1.  
Table 2 reports the information about ANOVA summary from this study. 
Table 2. 
ANOVAc
3E+010 1 3.366E+010 41.481 .000a
1E+011 138 811431412.0
1E+011 139
4E+010 2 1.955E+010 25.137 .000b
1E+011 137 777665899.0
1E+011 139
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression
Residual
Total
Model
1
2
Sum of
Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Predictors: (Constant), X11a. 
Predictors: (Constant), X11, X20b. 
Dependent Variable: X4c. 
 
F and Sig. - The F-value is in last model 2 yielding F=25.137.  The p-value associated with this F 
value is very small (0.000) is used to answer the question "Do the independent variables reliably 
predict the dependent variable?" Hence we could say that the group of variables (X11, X20) can be 
used to reliably predict dowry X4 (the dependent variable). It means that the model is significantly 
acceptable for prediction purpose for dowry.  
Table 3. 
Coefficients
a
 
Model  Unstandardized  
coefficients  
Standardized  
Coefficients 
t Sig  Collinearity  Statistics 
B Beta  Tolerance  VIF 
Constant  -2557.319  -1.011 .314   
X11 410.402 .417 5.430 .000 .903 1.107 
X20 30088.084 .203 2.644 .009 .903 1.107 
   a. Dependent Variable: X4 
 
Results from the estimation of parameters and coefficient values are reported in Table 3 above. Aside 
from all the variables in particular wet land owned X11, and dummy Husband‟s father secondary 
education X20 has a great influence on the amount of net dowry paid. The beta coefficients indicate 
the degree of influence the corresponding independent variable has on variations in the dependent 
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variable (the higher the value of b the more influential the independent variable) and the sign (pos., 
neg.) indicates the nature of the relationship (whether the independent variable and the dependent 
variable move together or in opposite directions).  
       Y = a + b1X 11 + b 2X 20   
As a result of above discussion the main estimating equation is better represented by:  
Dowry Predicted = -2557.319 + 410.402 * X11 + 30088.064 * X20     
The interpretation of the coefficients from a linear regression model is fairly straightforward which tell 
us about the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables as well as the 
amount of increase in dowry that would be predicted by a 1 unit increase in the predictor.  Where as 
the predicted values of constant (-2557.319), also depicts that the dowry paid is expected to be -
2557.319, when no wet land owned by husband as well as no secondary education husband father is 
completed. It means in this case dowry amount will be paid by the groom‟s family to bride‟s family in 
rural areas of the subcontinent. X20 which is a dummy variable is commonly used to examine group 
and time effects in regression. The dummy variables do not change the nature of the relationship or 
slope, but only provide for differing intercept among the groups 
 
Results: 
The finding in the model is that in case of all the variables given the one variable which statistically 
has an impact on dowry paid is the wet land owned by husband‟s house hold however there is no other 
independent variables influence on the dependent variable which have an impact on the dowry paid in 
the rural subcontinent. 
Another finding is that the dowry paid has a negative intercept, when no wet land owned by husband 
as well as no secondary education husband father is completed. It means in this case dowry amount 
will be paid by the groom‟s family to bride‟s family in rural areas of the subcontinent.  
Another finding is regarding the father‟s education that is also an important factor in all dummy 
variables which has an impact of getting education on secondary level, so it is inferred that in rural 
areas of subcontinent the father who have education on secondary level have only provide differing 
intercept among the group and add in the value of intercept not in the slope or the nature of 
relationship. Statistically the result provide support that not all variables in the given data are the 
determinant of dowry  but only two variables in which one is dummy variable have an impact and 
effect on the amount of dowry paid.  
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Conclusion: 
The results of the empirical analysis support the wet land owned by husband‟s household explaining in 
determining the value of dowry paid in urban areas, whereas dowries also serve the role of a pre-mortem 
inheritance in rural areas. Since the traditional custom of dowry in subcontinent is considered an 
inheritance to daughters, it appears that this custom still persists in rural areas whereas, like in Pakistan, 
India and Bangladesh, the custom has evolved into a groom price payment in urban areas (Anderson, S., 
2000). This would seem to suggest, that from the male perspective, the institution of dowry is not 
considered detrimental to either women or themselves. 
This is suggested by the fact that status and the affluence of husband‟s family as well as the secondary 
education of husband‟s father is an important determinant of the incidence of dowries. Moreover, the 
probability that brides' parents paid a dowry is not related to the age and schooling years of either brides 
or grooms or their families.  
Further, since most villagers support the practice of dowry, there is little threat of  anyone 
lodging a complaint. While the practical mechanisms for complaining about dowry are far 
beyond most villagers, especially women, one of the greatest barriers for women going to 
court is the realization that she will not be welcomed back to her own home if she makes an 
official complaint (Shahnaz. 2006). As Raziya of Dhitua opined, 
“
Without dowry, no one will 
take our daughters. If only the boys
’
 fathers decline to take dowry, then the practice will 
stop”. (Shahnaz. 2006). 
 
Discussion and Managerial Implications:  
From a scholarly perspective, dowry has spurred a flowering of sharp thinking about the 
economics and sociology of dowry and marriage payments more broadly. In  this sense, 
whether dowry exists or not is somewhat beside the point, as the theory and empirical tools 
that have been developed to address the issue are of broad utility to social scientists. From a 
practical and policy-making perspective, however, the question of the existence of dowry paid is 
critical. Using basic statistical techniques, we fail to corroborate the widespread cla im that real 
dowry amounts have risen substantially in South Asia. (Arunachalam and Logan, 2008) 
Despite this body of research, which is tested on the given data of rural areas of subcontinent is not 
significantly and practically supported our equation of explaining determinants of dowry, however it is 
also suggested that there may be many other construct that has not been examined. Even within the 
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context of this study, we cannot state which action should take to create specific behavior to control the 
dowry system.  
Thus we suggest that researcher should do more to understand the significant determinant of dowry. 
This would provide useful guidance to manager and executives. Thus we recommended that much 
work remains to be done to find out in term of developing a suitable equation of dowry system and 
empirically testing our proposition.  At the same time, encourage other scholars to continue the 
important work being done in this area. 
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Appendix 1 
Definitions of variables 
N = Observation Number, X1 = wife‟s height (cm), X2 = wife‟s age at marriage, X3 = wife‟s 
schooling years, X4 = net dowry paid (including marriage expenses) By the bride‟s household to the 
Groom‟s household (in constant 1983 rupees), X5 = dry land owned by Wife‟s household when she 
was 15, X6 = wet land owned by wife‟s household when she was 15, X7 = Husband‟s age at marriage, 
X8 = Husband‟s school years, X9 = Husband‟s height (cm), X10 = dry land owned by husband‟s 
household when he was 15,  
X11 = wet land owned by husband‟s household when he was 15, X12 = years of marriage, X13 = low-
caste dummy, X14 = medium-low-caste dummy, X15 = medium-high-caste dummy(excluded category 
is high caste), X16 = whether the husband‟s father was an agricultural cultivator (farmer), X17 = 
whether the husband‟s father was an (landless) laborer, X18 = dummy (husband‟s father had some 
primary education) 
X19 = dummy (husband‟s father completed primary education), X20 = dummy (husband‟s father 
completed middle or secondary school education) 
